EXPOSING THE NATURE OF ARAB ISLAMIC REASONING AND ITS INFLUENCE TOWARD INDONESIA
(Experiment of the Approach of M. Abed al-Jabiri’s Post Structuralism)

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ABSTRACT
The post structuralism approach is no longer a conventional approach. The emergence of this new approach was not only to respond to structuralism, but also to answer the bluntness of the old approach which was barely able to read the very complex reality and to break down the so complicatedly cultural lines. What al-Jabiri practises in dismantling the nature of Arabic reasoning is his experiment in examining the Arab community reasoning. Interestingly, in practicing the post-structuralism approach, al-Jabiri does not only immediately practice it, but he reconstructs the post-structuralism approach by borrowing others for sharper analysis. It means that the post-structuralism approach is not the final approach. However, criticism and development are needed to achieve the establishment of theory. The foundation of the first theory of this research stems from Foucault’s idea of archeology-genealogy of knowledge. The foundation of the next theory that the author takes from Foucault’s thinking is about discourse. This research is entirely library research; therefore, the first step that researchers did is to collect primary data, especially data related to the focus of this research. The data analysis phase was carried out using the following methods: method of interpretation, analysis and historical. The results of the research indicate that the advantages of the post-structuralism approach are the methodological implications of very different readings and producing something else and new. The results are quite astonishing that al-Jabiri is able to examine the logic of Arabic construction and find the character of reasoning that had been thinkable and unthinkable. The post-structuralism approach is ultimately able to distinguish the nature of the Arab community’s reasoning which can be distinguished into forming and formed reasoning.

Keywords: post-structuralism, epistemic, cognitive unconsciousness, sense-forming, dominant sense.

INTRODUCTION
Formed reasoning (al-‘aql al-mukawwan) is “a system of rules or rules that are accepted and standardized in a particular era and obtain absolute value in that era”. The formed reasoning has rules and laws of thought that are determined and forced unconsciously and used as a guide in arguing (istidlal). In the process of reasoning, basic principles or rules have been established as a reference framework for logical conceptualization. The formed reasoning also gives the possibility to produce knowledge that is fixed or stagnant, because the relationship between the self-reader and the object-read (interpreter with the text) does not come into contact with the socio-cultural dimension, either from the text formed or in the present context. The implications of such relationships produce knowledge that is normative and static so that there are almost no new findings at all. According
to Jabiri’s observations, it is not an illegitimate object (text) which is a matter, but it is precisely the self-reader who is shackled by reason, of course Jabiri’s view is different from Ali Harb’s as the writer stated above.

This limitation limits the way individuals or groups perceive nature, people and society and even about God. This limitation of perspective has been determined and enforced by standard principles and rules that occur in unconscious conditions. Another term, reason is in a position of ‘unconscious’ of the determination and coercion carried out by these principles and rules. This is what Jabiri calls as ‘cognitive unconsciousness’. More complicatedly, in an unconscious and shackled condition, the formation of reasoning until now feels safe in the position of the knowledge system or episteme respectively. The influence of this sense of reasoning results in the loss of critical reasoning, freedom, imagination and even speculation. The Frankfurt School names such conditions in terms of instrumental ratios or subjective reason.

**Theoretical Framework**

The first theory of this research stems from Foucault’s idea of archeology-genealogy of knowledge. Foucault goes through the episteme, which means “basic, archives, principles, or direction determinants”. This basic principle is assessed in the historical context, especially the history of thought, is crucial in building discursive structures. Foucault uses the episteme term to show a presupposition, principle, likelihood requirements and certain approaches that form a system secretly determine their thinking, perspective, observation and conversation (Bertens, 1983b: 314-315).

The next theory was taken from Foucault’s thought about discourse. Discursive practice is a way of producing knowledge, along with the accompanying social practices, as well as the forms of subjectivity that are formed from it, the power relations that lie behind these knowledge and social practices, and the interrelationships between all aspects. Discourse is not a series of words or propositions in text, but Foucault understands it as something that produces another, namely in the form of a theory, the concept is even more intended as science and philosophy. A discourse can be identified because it is a collection of ideas, opinions, concepts that are systematic and in the form of life views that are formed in certain contexts and result in influencing the way of thinking and acting of a particular group of people. This discursive practice is not only limiting, framing in a hegemonic discourse, but rather giving birth to knowledge (Bertens, 1983b: 315).

**Research Method**

This research is entirely library research; therefore, the first step that researcher did is to collect primary data, especially data related to the focus of this research. Data collection was done by coding each research data subsystem. This is qualitative research, in each stage researcher collected data dan analized them at the same time to understand the meaning and capture the core contained in the collected data categories (Kaelan, 2005: 159). The process of data collection were: 1) recording data in quotation, ie recording data from the data source directly and accurately record data on the data card in paraphrase, 2) record and capture the entire data core then record it on the data card, using sentences compiled by the researcher himself 3) record data synoptic, ie record data from data sources by making summaries or summaries (Kaelan, 2005: 160-161). The library material used is divided into two classifications, namely primary and secondary sources.

Qiyām fi as-Tsaqafah al-'Arabiyyah. In addition, there are also some other works of Michael Foucault, ie: (1) Archeology of Knowledge & Discourse on Language; (2) Power / Knowledge: Selected Interiew & Other Writings 1972-1977.

Secondary sources are complementary sources which are still related to the main theme, among them are al-Turaṣ wa al-Hadaṣah; Dirāsah wa Munāqasyah; Isykaliyyah al-Fikr al-‘Arabi al-Mua’sir; Arabic-Islamic Philoshophy; Post Traditionalism of Islam; several works of journals, articles, newspapers and websites (internet) related to the theme of the research directly.

The data analysis phase was carried out using the following methods: Method of interpretation, the first step in this research research is to describe and reveal the essential meanings contained in the object of research. For data in the form of verbal data, the analysis of interpretation was carried out with the first stage of revealing semantic meaning, then revealing the meaning of depth, essential or deep structure. This intrinsic meaning in reasoning criticism is of course not only at the empirical level, but also understands what the context behind the emergence of ideas, motives and even the ideology that is carried in the idea. The method of analysis was used to analyze the concepts and discourse objectively and critically based on the meaning of the word. This analysis was purely based on mere reasoning. Analytical truths are considered, created, and sustained by the decisions of human abriters by using concepts that are solely the implications of linguistic conventions. The application of this method was carried out by revealing and analyzing Jabiri’s reasoning criticism on one hand, and analyzing the practice of Foucault’s power and knowledge on the other.

Historical methods seek to link a thought with cultural, ideological, political, and social historicity. This method also attempts to determine the periodization historically (Bakker and Charris Zubair, 1990: 21).This method was applied to look at the historicity of Jabiri’s thinking, especially his critics of reasoning and his model of thinking and philosophical projects. In addition, this method was also used to see the formation of Indonesian Islamic reasoning appearing in the scope of history and long struggles. The heuristic method is the theory of finding a way to deal with a problem scientifically. Heuristics are always ahead of science. Science itself must precisely describe, explain, prove and this does not cover, explicitly, the path that is passed to the science (heuristics). Then heuristics are usually regarded as a field that cannot be sharply matched. Medan covers a large number of non-scientific factors, but it becomes important for the emergence of knowledge or science (Van Peursen, 1985: 97). The factors which have been considered non-scientific are in the form of metaphysical assumptions, discovery contexts, prejudices, and others. The discovery or renewal of this research was expected to give birth to new offers, especially in the field of epistemology and methodology. The author is very optimistic about the emergence of renewal in this research, because the analysis of Foucault’s archaeological-genealogical approach to the critics of Jabiri’s reasoning will try to read Jabiris from formal objects that are patterned not only ‘philosophical-rational’ but also conditions or situations that have been ignored in the boundary - limited to modern rationality.

In general, the methodical steps were first directed at interpreting the data selected in accordance with the title of this research, this first methodical step was expected to be able to comprehend in depth the critical ideas of reason, as well as the formal theoretical or object basis used as an analytical framework. The next step, the author used the method of analysis as a pre-condition in applying the theoretical basis of criticism of reason. The results of the analysis as well as its relevance in the context of Indonesia are the writer’s space in giving birth to new findings in this study. The main key to finding new understanding in this study lies in the consistency of the author using a theoretical framework to be used to analyze the criticism of Jabiri’s reason as a material object.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Post Structuralism Approach and Reality of the Arab Community

The overlapping of the Arab cultural era occurred among Arabic thinkers. Arabic thinkers always consumed classical knowledge as if it were new knowledge, without being able to distinguish whether the knowledge was derived from pure or imported Arabic one. If it is compared to other cultures, such as the middle age or the modern culture, the overlapping of Arabic thought in the cultural era includes two levels, namely vertical and horizontal (synchronous and diachronic) levels, that area level of consciousness, in a form that is so difficult to organize and order (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 65-67)). According to Jabiri, this phenomenon of cultural era overlapping can also be seen in the complexity of contemporary Arabic thought, like a kind of “cultural nomadism”. ‘Leap’ of thought from left to right, from the ‘rational’ to ‘irrational’ is a tangible form of the complexity of Arabic thought. This is due to the variety of contemporary readings which cannot solve the real problems which occur in Arabic reasoning, a method and approach which is fragile at the theoretical level and is a historical at the application level or way of working. Starting from this phenomenon, Al-Jabiri launched a reading that was different from previous thinkers, a reading of the terms from contemporary, structuralism, to post-structuralism nuances.

The philosophy of post-structuralism greatly influences the thinking of Al-Jabiri in criticizing Arabic reasoning. Some terms such as ‘episteme’, discontinuity, cognitive unconsciousness, epistemological termination, and so on become a part that is not overlooked in developing the methodology and approach. At least, according to Al-Jabiri’s recognition the episteme concept was taken from post-structuralism philosopher, Michel Foucault (Jabiri, 1991: 55); the concept of cognitive awareness was taken from Jean Peagett which was a refinement of Sigmund Freud’s unconscious concept, and was also taken from Ibrahim Sayyar an-Nazham with borrowing the term “harakah I’timād “and” harakah naqlah’. Therefore, although Al-Jabiri took the aforementioned concepts, he still repackaged those concepts when applying them in the context of Arabic reasoning.

The term of episteme is closely related to the notion of the archaeology of knowledge from the French post-structuralis philosopher, Michel Foucault. This term comes from Greek which means knowledge. In Foucault’s view, episteme means “basic, archives, principles, or determinants”. In the historical context, especially the history of thought, Foucault uses the episteme term to show a presupposition, principle, possible conditions and certain approaches which form a system quietly determined their thoughts, perspectives, observations and talks (Bertens, 1983b: 314-315). Episteme has a structure. In this case Foucault equates episteme with systems of thought and becomes the epistemological foundation of every era that influences the style of knowledge built on it (Susilo and Prasetyo TW, XVI: 17). Therefore, every era has a different episteme. Thus, the effort to explore episteme which determines the direction of a particular period is the knowledge archaeology (Bertens, 1983b: 315); Foucault, 1982: 138-140). In the study, Foucault intended to find the episteme which underlies certain disciplines and the defining characteristics of knowledge for each period, which Foucault called as a century (Susilo and Prasetyo, XVI: 17).

However, in the hands of Al-Jabiri, the episteme concept undergoes several developments which of course are adapted to the object of the study under study, in this case Arabic reasoning. Then, Al-Jabiri defines episteme as follows; Episteme is “a number of concepts, basic principles and activities to acquire knowledge in a particular historical era, namely in the form of a conscious structure”. In other words, episteme is a system of knowledge in a particular culture in the form of an unconscious structure (Jabiri, 2003b: 64). From here it can be seen that the difference between Michel Foucault and Al-Jabiri is the phrase ‘structure that is conscious’, this is an original additional form of Al-Jabiri.
This is done to reveal the Arabic reasoning that the test structure is unconscious. Herein lies the first methodological contribution, namely, the episteme concept taken from Michel Foucault and developed by him.

After borrowing the episteme concept from Michel Foucault, Al-Jabiri then directs the steps of the methodology and its approach to the additional sentences which are inserted when he defined the episteme term, namely, ‘unconsciousness’. This concept was first taken from Sigmund Freud and then sharpened by taking the concept of Jean Pieaget’s cognitive unconsciousness (Bertens, 1979: 347, 249). The phase of Freud psychoanalytic development occurred in three periods. In the first period (Bertens, 1983a: xvi-xiv), Al-Jabiri borrowed it implicitly and methodologically to strengthen the analysis of conditions that occurred in Arabic reasoning.

In the first period of psychoanalysis and this first stage, Sigmund Freud described psychological conditions that were structural or topographic. This psychological life is divided into three structures, namely: “the unconscious”, “the preconscious”, and “the conscious”. Freud said that “the preconscious” and “the conscious” form a system with “the conscious” or consciousness. “The prescription” together with consciousness are the ego (Bertens, 1983a: xxiii). Thus, Freud only distinguishes psychic into two namely; pre-conscious system and unconscious system. The unconscious is likened to being repressed, in the sense of being forgotten but its energy remains intact, living in unconsciousness, whereas the repressive is an awareness-conscious or ego system.

The distinction of “unconscious” and “conscious” structures was taken by Al-Jabiri in establishing his hypothesis about the existence of an Arabic logical structure that was in an “unconscious” condition. Even though in the “unconscious” condition, that is in a condition that is repressed, what has been forgotten is not lost at all but remains alive and intact in unconsciousness (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 67). Herein lies the second methodological contribution. Namely the differentiation of psychological conditions carried out by Sigmund Freud on the study of Arabic reasoning carried out by Al-Jabiri.

Arabic reasoning, in relation to culture, is an epistemic (active and dominant) device which at the same time is formed and produced unconsciously. Al-Jabiri’s analysis of the structure of Arabic reasoning is sharply done by borrowing the concept of “cognitive unconsciousness” Jean Pieaget. In contrast to these psychologists who use the “cognitive unconscious” approach to examine individual reasoning structures, Al-Jabiri uses this concept of “cognitive unconsciousness” to examine the structure of collective reasoning, namely Arab society.

The concept of “cognitive unconsciousness” is actually used by Jean Peaget to examine the elements forming individual reason (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 67-68), but Al-Jabiri diverts Jean Peaget’s structural psychology towards the area of cultural epistemology. Thus what is meant by Arabic “cognitive unconsciousness” is a number of cognitive concepts and activities that limit the perspective of Arabs - that is, those related to Arab culture - to nature, humans, society and nature. Therefore, the structure of Arabic reasoning means the concepts and thoughts that equip people who are related to Arabic culture, and form a “cognitive unconscious” that directs their perspective (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 67-68).

According to Al-Jabiri, the concept of “cognitive unconsciousness” is inserted with the aim of not falling on an unscientific concept caused by a number of stagnant concepts, such as the concept of ‘rationality’ ('aqlaniyyah). The concept of “cognitive unconsciousness” helps restore the knowledge activity of concepts and mechanisms that are totally unaware but can be researched, approached and analysed (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 69).

For Al-Jabiri, the era of “cognitive unconscious” is ahistorical because it does not recognize the “scientific era”, an era that knows
no boundaries of space and time, the initial and final order, it has its own era which is completely different from the era of consciousness. The era of ‘unconsciousness’ is similar to the way of the Arab cultural era, an era that overlaps, is wavy, extends like a spiral, so that the different cultural stages (in the form of concepts, thoughts) can coexist in an era of cultural one. The old concept or mind and the new side by side form “cultural identity” (scientific, philosophical or literary) at a new stage altogether. That way between the new and the old can be “parallel”, “sequential”, “balanced” and or even “cut off”. But clearly, as long as the new ones do not make the final termination at all, as long as the cognitive system is only one, as long as the new can coexist with the old in any discourse, everything is still in a cultural era (Ladislus, 2003: 129).

Cultural era in culture according to Ibrahim Ibn Sayyar an-Nadham - well-known as a Mu’tazilite thinker - there is a possibility that there are two movements, namely static movement (i’tīmad ḥarakah), which is moving in place, and moving dynamically (ḥaraqah naqlah) movement which results in the transfer from one place to another. What happens in static movements is the phases of thought are always accumulative, overlapping and mutually competent, it is not “fused” and also not “divided”. Most importantly for Al-Jabiri is that the movement in Arabic culture is a static movement, thus the Arab cultural era is an era that is “stagnant” (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 65-67).

In addition to the structuralism approach, the historical-historical analysis is also used by Al-Jabiri in dismantling the episteme of Arabic reasoning. This is evident in the historical division of Arabic thought that is different from other contemporary thinkers. According to Al-Jabiri there are three periods of Arabic thought, namely the first “era of ignorance” of the cultural era which lasted between 50 and 100 years before Islam, second then the “era of progress” which lasted since the emergence of Islam until about the 8th century, a few centuries after experiencing setbacks, and the third, just entering the era of revival that began from the early 19th century to

the present (Jabiri, 2003: 80-87).

The discussion of Arabic culture requires thinkers to examine the three ‘cultural eras’ above, because it is not possible if the discussion of Arabic culture is only limited to a single ‘cultural era’, if so there is an ‘epistemological rift’ between the cultural era and each other. Even though what actually happened was not an epistemological rift, there were three separate epistemological islands. In short, to achieve progress, Arab society must continue to establish relations (continuity) with the three cultural eras of the past (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 80-87).

The following are the methodological steps and approaches taken by Al-Jabiri.

a. Separating “readable objects” from “subject-readers”: Problem of objectivity

To pursue objectivity, it takes two stages; the first stage, the subject must separate himself from his tradition to an objective attitude, from which Al-Jabiri points to the achievements of modern linguistics as an objective approach to confirm the separations between subjects and texts. Text is positioned as a network of relationships as well as the object of research, and carefully studied so that subjects are free from the text. In the first stage, it is necessary to separate the subject from the object that allows the subject to get the dynamics back in order to rebuild the object in a new perspective (al-Jabiri, 2003a: 37-38). The second stage, separates the object from the subject, so that in turn, the object regains independence, personality, identity, and history. The first step taken by Al-Jabiri was carried out in three phases; namely through a structuralist approach (as the authors describe above), a historical approach, and an ideological approach (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 39).

b. Reconnecting “readable objects” from “subject-readers”: Problem of Communion.

Object-read is an Arabic tradition, cleansing tradition does not mean avoiding or destroying tradition, but to link it back to us in a new form, as well as in a new pattern of relationships, so that tradition can become a lifetime with the
reader’s life (al-Jabiri, 2003a: 40). The dominant drafting pattern is located in the deepest area, in the language (behind logic). Therefore, these hidden ideas will be able to unfold when they are surpassed within the limits of the languages and the language’s logic (Jabiri, 2003: 40). For Al-Jabiri, this is only achieved by “intuition” (al-Jabiri, 2003a: 40), namely the intrusion of mathematics, as the only device capable of creating self-read (self-read) into self-reader (reading-self), and able to create self-read taking part of the problematic and attention of the self-reader, as well as being self-read interested in various ideas. They are direct and coloratoric representations that reveal evidence, and provide a variety of anticipatory understandings, when there is a dialogue between self-readers and self-readings, it is created based on objective data that emerges from the first methodical steps above. The implication of this type of text reading model will appear not-said text.

The structuralis approach and historical analysis of Al-Jabiri at the same time provide two fairly basic conclusions. First, on one hand, there has been an overlapping of the Arab ‘cultural era’ since jahiliyah until now (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 80-87). Although historically-factually Arabic culture is divided into three “eras”, in essence there is only one cultural era, namely the static era that forms a fundamental part of cultural identity and the characteristics of its civilization. The character of a static cultural era is not characterizing or enriching to grow new things, but rather side by side, competing and shaping it. Second, on the other hand in the history of Arabic culture there was a separation between space and time which resulted in “cultural nomadism” by following other nations. This results in the loss of cultural harmony of the Arab nation, or at least the absence of actualization of cultural harmony perfectly in the phase of Arab history to date (Jabiri, 2003b: 45-46).

Methodical steps and approaches based on several aspects and at the same time become the direction of the critical critics, these methodical principles are: (1) Unity of thought: the unity of problems. In Al-Jabiri’s perspective, unitary systems of thought are not defined according to the ownership of the community’s systems of thought (religion, nation, language, etc.) or according to the identity of the topic being studied, or membership in the system of thought in the same line of space and time. It is also not based on differences in the topic of the study of the author, era or place of the writer. However, what determines and creates the deviation of thinking is the unity of problems. While the problem itself is interpreted by Al-Jabiri as a network of relationships within a particular system of thought, which covers a variety of problems and interacts with it “Resurrection problems” for example, what is discussed is not the ‘resurrection problem’, but overlapping network problems, so the problem is thoroughly. (2) Historical thinking: the field of cognitive and ideological content, the cognitive field is “a field that limits the motion of a thought, it is formed from” cognitive material “which is homogeneous, namely various conceptual devices that are homogeneous (such as nations, concepts, methods, etc.) the ideological content brought about by thought is an ideological (socio-political) function, where an author or even the writers of the tradition of thought subordinate their cognitive material to ideological functions “ (Jabiri, 2003a: 40-46).

The past reality or overlapping tradition for Al-Jabiri cannot be studied according to positivistic perspective, a perspective that only emphasizes on the empirical dimension, which only illustrates mere phenomena. Whereas the object of the study of Arabic reasoning criticism is not only to describe or analyse it, but also to “interpret and change”, without ignoring the cultural character of the Arab itself.

The word “reason” is used by Al-Jabiri to carry out the project of criticizing Arab epistemology, Al-Jabiri has its own reasons for using the word. For him, the word “reason” has more “neutral” meaning, especially if it relates to certain political or ideological conditions. This is certainly different when the word “reason” is replaced with the word “thought”. According to him, if the words
of thought are related to adjectives and associated with certain societies, such as Arabic thought, French thought, it means referring to the content of thought, namely a set of views and thoughts in which society expresses concern, ethical ideals and doctrine of the school, to his socio-political ambitions. In other words, the word “thought” in this sense has the same meaning or meaning as ideology. Because of this meaning Al-Jabiri avoids using the word “thought”, because in the past he has concentrated his project on the epistemological region, not the ideological region (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 25-26).

According to Al-Jabiri, the word “thought” has two connections at once, namely thoughts related to “thought” itself, and thoughts related to ideology. Thought that is related to “thought” itself is a thought as a tool for producing thought (al-fiqr ka ‘adah li intāj al-fiqr), while thought related to ideology means the collection of thought itself (al-fiqr bi wasihi majmu’ al-afkār zatuhu). The distinction made by Al-Jabiri, namely thinking as a device (al-fiqr ka‘adah) and thinking as a product (al-fiqr kamuhtawa’) is a necessity for him and is merely a methodological consideration (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 26-30).

Although there is overlapping between thinking as a device and thought as a product, both of them are products of certain socio-community interactions, therefore Arabic thinking is not merely interpreted as a collection of concepts, views and a number of theories which are expressions of the reality of Arab society with certain expression models, but he is a product that is shaped by the reality of Arab society with all its peculiarities. Up to this point, it can be seen, as a preliminary description, about the relationship between language and thought and the characteristics of that relationship in Arabic culture.

The relationship between thought and culture is reflected in the concept of “cultural ethnicity” (al-jinsiyyah al-sāqafiyyah), that is, every thinker is not classified in a particular culture unless he “thinks in the culture” (al-tafkīr dahiluhu). Thinking about a particular culture is not thinking about that culture, but thinking through a particular culture (al-fiqr biwasih majmu’ al-afkār zatuhu). Al-Farabi for example, he was an Arab - who with all his traditions and prejudices - thought of Greek culture, meaning al-Farabi thought Greek culture through Arabic culture. So thinking through a particular culture is thinking through a referential system (manzūmah marji‘iyah) which forms the basic coordinates, namely the determinants and formers of culture, in the form of cultural heritage, social environment, and perspective on the future even his views on nature, the world and humans.

Then what is the relationship between thought, history and culture with Arabic reasoning? It was here that Al-Jabiri then gave an initial restriction on the concept of Arabic Reason that was connected to culture and history. According to him, “Arabic reasoning” is thought as a tool to spawn theoretical products that are shaped by culture and have their own peculiarities; a culture that contains the history of Arab civilization, expressing reality, the causes of its decline and its future dreams. In other words, thinking as a device that spawns theoretical products is a cultural formation, while culture itself contains history (Gadamer, 1986: 25). This initial limit on Arabic reasoning is very much related to Al-Jabiri’s concentration in studying epistemology (Jabiri, 2003b: 26-27).

**Differentiation between Forming Reasoning and Formed (Dominant) Reasoning**

The concentration of Al-Jabiri’s project is an epistemological; it is seen as a tool for producing thought and not the product of thought itself. Therefore, the product of thought in the form of views, theories, schools or ideologies, is not Jabiri’s concern. A further problem is the possibility of overlapping between thinking as a device and thinking as a product, namely when what is meant by “reasoning” is thinking as a device, does the meaning of “reasoning” not contain any products of thought? To overcome
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this problem, Al-Jabiri finally decided to take Andree Lalanda’s sense theory.

According to Andree Lalanda, reasoning is divided into two; First, forming or active reasoning (al-’aql al-mukawwin), in the French term la raison constituant e, is cognitive activity in examining and studying and forming concepts and formulating basic principles. All humans have something in common at this first stage of reasoning. The second, is the reason which is formed or dominant (al-’aql al mukawwan), in French terms la raison constituée, it represents a number of “principles and rules that are used as a guiding argument (istidlāl). According to Lalanda, although this reasoning is formed and changes to a certain extent and differs between periods of one another, but this reason still exists in a certain period and is temporal. In other words, reason is formed “a system of rules or rules that are accepted and standardized in a particular era, and obtain absolute value during that era” (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 29).

Reasoning in its second form is then used as a theoretical foundation by al-Jabiri to dissect the thinking traditions of the Arabs who have given birth to great works and become hegemonic in the natural culture of thinking of religious life of most Muslims. So, what is meant by al-Jabiri with Arabic reasoning is the rules or laws of thought that apply in the Arab world that have a close connection to the background of the language as well as the characters hidden behind it. Or in other words, a set of concepts, perception and activity of the reasoning that determines the views of society, which is affiliated with Arabic culture, his views on nature, humanity, society, and history (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 31-34).

Thus, reasoning in this sense is not only reasoning as a system, but also related to historicity and “sub-consciousness” (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 31-34). In this framework Al-Jabiri said that the system of knowledge in one culture is at the same time also a structure of inequality. And, in turn, this reasoning system becomes a standard or legal requirement to obtain knowledge.

After seeing the boundaries of the ‘Arabic reasoning’ (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 31-34), Al-Jabiri then defines Arabic reasoning as follows:

“... what we mean by “Arabic reasoning” is the constituted reason (al-’aql al-mukawwan), which is the set of rules and laws (thinking) given by Arab culture to its adherents as a basis for gaining knowledge. These rules and laws of thought are determined and unconsciously imposed as episteme of present-day Arab society by Arab culture (Jabiri, 1991: 15).

The existence of such Arabic reasoning requires Al-Jabiri to carry out an objective analysis of it (Jabiri, 1982: II), one of the analysis he does is to do a comparison between Arabic reasoning and modern Greek-European reasoning. Al-Jabiri reviews very comprehensively and is accompanied by a historical analysis of the development of Ancient Greek, European-modern to contemporary epistemology (Amin, 1975: 30). The interesting conclusion to the historical-objective analysis he did was that the Greco-European reason had two permanent elements: First, the relationship of reason and nature was seen as a direct relationship. Secondly, intellect is believed to be able to explain and reveal the secrets of nature (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 49-53).

The first permanent element is the basis of the viewpoint of existence, and the second becomes the basis of the perspective on knowledge. Therefore both of them are clearly separated by Al-Jabiri. Empirically, the two together form a permanent structural element whose pillars are the center of the relationship in the system of reason around one axis, namely reason and nature (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 50).

The following brief description will compare the world view of the Greco-European reasoning with Arabic reasoning. In the realm of thought, world view of the God-Man-Nature - European-Greek thought has two poles, namely the human pole and the pole nature; while the poles of God experience nuance or disappear. In Arabic reasoning also has two poles, namely the pole of God and the pole of man, while the poles of nature experience impotence. The loss of the pole of God
in Greek reason is the same as the loss of the poles of Nature in Arabic reason. The comparison made by Al-Jabiri is not merely to draw conclusions, but precisely with this comparison the ‘curtain’ of Arabic reasoning can be revealed (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 49-53).

Seeing the objective conditions of the Arabic reasoning above, Al-Jabiri then criticized it. Deep and strong mastery over the tradition of classical Islam, ranging from language, *kalām*, *taṣawwuf* and philosophy, and a strong mastery of contemporary methods and approaches, especially philosophy (post) structuralism, has its own implications for the project of criticism of reason. Al-Jabiri introduced Islamic thought as a system, or rather as episteme, and the manifestation of thought as a system was manifested in reason as the compiler stated above.

If M. Arkoen measures the episteme boundaries with the measure of time, namely “classical Islam” (Arkoen, 1994: 117-118; Meuleman, ed, 1996: 120-121; Syaukani, 1994: 23), “medieval” and “modern century”, Al-Jabiri measures the episteme boundaries for what he calls *syurūṭ al-siḥḥah* (validity requirements of knowledge). The episteme boundary referred to as “legality requirements” reminds us of Kant’s “pure ratio criticism” project or Levi-Staruss’s “structural anthropology,” (Ahimsa-Putra, 2001: 66-67) which examines the possible conditions of human reasoning activities (Paz, 1997: vii-xi). For Ahmad Baso, the critique of Al-Jabiri’s Arabic reasoning is more similar to Levi-Strauss’s “structural anthropology”, because Levi-Strauss’s “reason” is identical to “unconscious structures” that resembles Al-Jabiri’s notions of “conditions - a sign of validity “in Arabic reasoning (Baso, 2000: xxxiiii).

“Terms of validity” in Arabic reasoning are identical to something that is unconscious, which has a close relationship between the two. According to Al-Jabiri - by quoting the idea of culture according to E. Herriot - culture is “everything left when everything has been forgotten”. What remains is reasoning itself, that is reason in the above sense, while what is forgotten is everything that changes. In fact, what changed in Arab culture turned out to be something that remained and remains until now, without the exception of the current logic of Arab community (Baso, 2000: xxxiii).

The relationship between reason and culture associated with it is an unconscious relationship because what is totally forgotten is not completely lost, but still live in the unconscious or subconscious. This reasoning is an active or dominant epistemic device which at the same time is formed and is also produced unconsciously. Herein lies the contribution of the concept of “cognitive unconsciousness” introduced by Al-Jabiri in his Critic Arab Reasoning (KNA) project (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 67).

While quoting Sigmund Fruead’s opinion that what is forgotten is not gone, but it remains alive and resides in unconsciousness. Strating from here, he stepped up following Jean Piaget regarding the concept of “cognitive unconsciousness”. So, what remains in the sense of “reason as a system and unconsciousness” is “legality requirements” which until now still dominate massively unconsciously in the frame of mind of the Arab community, in particular, and Muslims in general (Baso, 2000: xxxiii).

To further strengthen the concentration of his project, concerning criticism of reason which also means epistemological criticism, Al-Jabiri then said:

“......... What remains after the historical functions and roles that have taken place are subtle and hidden elements, which until now still determine and influence Arabic culture, as well as Arabic reasoning. These remaining elements determine the ‘validity requirements’ that are used as a reference by each of the conflicting parties, as well as a perspective and paradigm. Therefore, this study is not grounded in ideological conflict which circulates externally the processes of formation and freezing of scientific disciplines (*tadwīn*), but precisely in epistemological conflicts, namely conflicts of ‘conditions of knowledge’” (al-Jabiri, 1991: 70).

The analysis of Al-Jabiri’s reasoning critics came to the initial conclusion, that the implications
of the critics of reasoning carried out, using a post-structuralist philosophical approach, and determined the occurrence of epistemological conflict, namely the conflict of “conditions of knowledge”. From here, then Al-Jabiri examines, historically, the process of forming knowledge.

The Determination Process for ‘Knowledge Requirements’.

The starting point of the “history of Islamic thought” began in the period of standardization and book keeping (’aṣr tadwīn) of science, which is around the 2nd century H (around the 8th century) (Baso, 2000: xxxv-xxxvi). This is certainly different from the historical tradition of classical Islamic thought which pegged the era of jahiliyyah or the birth of Islam as a starting point. Al-Jabiri’s benchmarking of the starting point of the “history of Islamic thought” in the Tadwin era, is because we know many times of ignorance or early Islamic history, which we know precisely after the ‘reconstruction’ in the codification era. In addition to the codification period is the period of coding of knowledge, this period is also the background for the formation of “knowledge requirements”. More importantly, the tadwin period is a “comprehensive reconstruction in culture” (T’adah al-binā’ ‘al-saqā’i al-‘ālam).

In this context Al-Jabiri quotes and analyzes ad–Dahabi’s, which published in Jalaluddin as-Suyuthi’s opinion in his book Tarīkh al-Khulāfa’ (Suyuthi, 1988: 210):

“Al-Dahabi said: ‘In 143 H the ulama at this time began to collect and record hadith, fiqh, and interpretations. In Mecca Ibn Juraih appeared who wrote a book, Malik wrote the book ‘al-Muwattha’ in Medina, al-Auza’i in Sham, Ibn Abi’ Urubah, Hammad bin Salamah and others in Basrah, Ma’mar in Yemen and Sufyan as-Tsauri in Kufah. During this period Ibn Ishaq wrote al-Maghazi, and Abu Hanifah about fiqh and ra’yu. Then followed by Husayyim, al-Laits and Ibn Lahibah, then Ibn Mubarrak, and Abu Yusuf and Ibn Wahh, and the tadwin movement in a number of scientific disciplines increased and became increasingly widespread. At that time, Arabic, history and lectionography books were published, meanwhile, before the tadwin era Arab society relied on memorizing and narrating science from non-neatly arranged texts”.

From the text spoken by ad-Dahabi, it gives quite important information for Al-Jabiri, according to him there are three things contained in the text: First, the text stipulates that the year 143 H is the codified era (al-’aṣr al-tadwīn), which began the era of al-Mansur during the Abbasid period. But if the codification was understood as a form of recording and writing, it had already taken place at the time of the Prophet and khulāfa’. Second, the text stipulates the places or cities of the codification process, namely Mecca, Medina, Sham, Basrah, Kufa and Yemen. A place where knowledgeable people (who have notes and memorize Islamic traditions) codify and classify knowledge, and this is where scientific discipline arises. Third, the text also shows that there is a process of transmission of knowledge taking place, that is, from record knowledge and memorization, turning into a book that is arranged systematically (Suyuthi, 1988: 104).

Codification and classification of science is not producing science, because what creates science is scientists. Therefore, the definition of science in the context of the process of codification and classification is transmitted science (marwiyyat) in the form of hadiths, interpretations and other sciences. Although the role of people who codify and classify knowledge is limited to ‘fortifying’ and ‘classification’ of Arab cultural heritage, the process certainly takes place with ‘thought’, because all of that cannot take place without selection, ‘correction’, termination and escort. In fact, the process is a comprehensive process of reconstruction of the Islamic heritage which has become a reference framework for Arab society’s view of nature, people and their environment (Suyuthi, 1988: 104-105).

As an epistemological reviewer, Al-Jabiri analyses other issues of the text. The hadith scholars determine the epistemological principles tunderlie the method (Suyuthi, 1988: 104-105), as a consequence, the category of hadith ‘science’ for example, is as follows: “when we say that ‘a hadith is valid’ does not mean it is certainly valid, but valid in terms - the conditions we set, as the scholars of ‘hadiths say that’ a hadith is not valid ‘does not mean that the invalidity is
certain. So, a hadith can be valid or not valid according to the conditions we set. It also occurs in various disciplines, such as interpretations, jurisprudence, language and so on.

The terms set by the ulama 'is not a' science ('in the sense of marawiyyat), but is an activity of thought 'or reason. Thus, the conditions of validity in hadith, fiqh, language, grammar and theology - are the first and most obvious forms of Arabic reasoning. This is the reason formed (al-'aql al-mukawwan) in Arabic culture, the Arabic reasoning in its appearance is the clearest and most powerful of its constituent elements which is still used as a reference framework.

The post-structuralist approach has different implications in reading the text spoken by ad-Dhahabi, Al-Jabiri then asks questions; 'What is not said' by the text and how to silence it? What is not said by text (not said), namely;

First, the text silenced "codification and classification" of knowledge in Syia'h circles, even though history records that Ja'far Sadiq (D. 148 H) had pioneered the bookkeeping and classification of movements which were part of Shia teachings. The occupation of Shi'ite science is 'objective conditions' which limit and frame the validity requirements of Sunni 'science', and vice versa. Continuing competition is equally questioning the 'credibility' of science by relying on the history of its codification to the previous caliphs, even to the apostles (Amin, 1961: 106). Sunni groups, for example, returned the codification process at the time of Umar bin Abd Aziz, while Syiah returned it before the era of Umar bin Abd Aziz even to the time of the apostle (Amin, 1961: 106).

Second, the implication of the definition of 'science' mentioned above, namely 'knowledge based on transmission', explicitly ignores or silences other sciences, namely outside the marawiyyat category. These sciences are the science of kalam and 'ilm al-awāil (ancient pre-Islamic heritage sciences). Though history records, that Washil ibn Atha' (d. 131 H) had written the work of kalam, and there had been a translation of pre-Islamic early sciences in the time of Khalid ibn Yazid bin Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan (d. 85 H) of the Umaiyyad era. This Umayyad ruler asked a group of people to translate Greek and Qibtiyyah books into Arabic, especially chemistry books, to explain how to process gold and silver mines. Meanwhile, pre-Islamic ancient sciences also flourished in the Islamic world, this was due long before the emergence of Islam these sciences were widely adopted by Arabs (Amin, nd: 32-33).

Third, the ongoing Arabization of the bureaucracy which began during Abd al-Malik bin Marwan (65-87 H) was a process of gathering Arabic, so non-Arabic (Roman or Persian) languages were directly eliminated. And Fourth, the other side that was silenced by the text was political codification. Among the political opponents of the Abbasid government at that time was Abdullah bin Muqaffa', so the works of Abdullah bin Muqaffa' became 'political' work for the Abbasids, so ad-Dhahabi did not say it in the text (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 107-113).

Then, the question is why does ad-Dhahabi silence it all? According to M. Abed Al-Jabiri, this happened not because of forgetfulness or subjective encouragement. The silence of ad-Dhahabi is one of the “objective conditions” that cover the validity requirements of the Sunni sciences (al-Jabiri, 2003b: 107-113), precisely "silence arises because of the epistemological and ideological reference authority factor adopted by the text and which determines the scope of knowledge of the Entirely Sunni. That authority is the episteme itself which is confirmed by these "legal requirements” (Bas0, 2000: xxxvii).

In the context of “epistemological and ideological reference authority”, precisely in the tadwīn era, Al-Jabiri determined the emergence of three episteme, each of which was different and involved in conflicts with one another, this conflict was caused by differences in the “validity requirements” that they set.

Metodological Implication on Indonesia

The formed reasoning, al-'aql al-mukawwan, becomes a reasoning of some of Indonesian people. This episteme crisis fundamentally affects their mindset and even their worldview.
What is the ontological problem of the episteme crisis? The paper examines the problem. One of hypothesis states that the episteme crisis is strongly affected by a colonial reasoning that has strongly controlled the work of reasoning of Indonesian people. The research explores the problem archaeologically and genealogically to find more deeply a construction of past traditions and cultures. In this sense, the cultural period of Indonesia can at least be traced through four cultural periods: the genius local period, the Islamic empire period, the colonial period and the post-colonial period.

The results of the research show that each period has the fundamental construction or dominated characteristics of a culture and civilization. The genius local period is constructed by a culture of solidarity; the kingdom era is clearly built by osmosis culture (mutual absorbing inter culture); and the colonial and post-colonial period are characterized by the formation of reasoning that is intentionally plugged by colonialist in Indonesian mind.

As a nation with very long historical and cultural roots, the Indonesian people are rich with cultural heritage and awaken their philosophical thinking. In its geographic characteristic, the Indonesian nation is a cluster of territories sprinkled with richness and biodiversity and is inhabited by various tribes with different languages, religions, customs, and values as a manifestation of the worldview, and characterized by the state of its territory consisting of oceans as well as islands (land) that are studded on it.

Research on the identity of the Indonesian nation is directed to seek and examine the basic building of reasoning and the underlying principles, how the structure and its influence on the community in that period. This research is very important to see comprehensively, whether the reasoning of each period is sustained or disconnected.

A brief study using this archaeological method becomes an experiment to see whether the historical conditions of Indonesian culture fit to the theory or not. If it fits, it will certainly strengthen the theoretical building. On literature review the author has conducted, some of the literatures or studies that deal with the formed reasoning in every era, especially the cultural era of the archipelago are not too numerous. Among them are: Moehtar Lubis’ book “Manusia Indonesia” (2001), Indonesian Man, but almost all of the traits given are negative. Unlike Lubis, Toety Herati gives a pretty positive view of the challenge of Indonesian people. This research will be at least a little bit with the character of the Indonesian nation studied from the period of culture.

The foundation of the first theory of research is based on Foucault’s idea of archeology-the genealogy of knowledge. Foucault goes back to the episteme, which means “base, archive, principle, or milestone.” This basic principle is valued in the context of history, especially the history of thought, crucial in building discursive structures. Foucault uses term episteme to denote a presupposition, principle, conditions of possibility and certain approaches that form a tacit system that has determined their thoughts, worldviews, observations and conversations (Bertens, 1983b: 311-315).

The episteme has a structure, so in this case Foucault likens the episteme to the system of thought and becomes the epistemological foundation of every age that influences the style of science built upon it. Every epoch has a different episteme, conceptually a new episteme is able to substitute the old episteme and how the new episteme circulates itself in such a way as to shift the old episteme until a later time has the basic tone of another regularity of thought when compared to the previous epoch.

The attempt to explicitly “dig” the episteme that determines the course of a certain period is what archeology called as knowledge. The goal of archeology of knowledge is the typical frame of thought of an age and structure of thought capable of giving meaning to the world. Archeology requires history, Foucault seeks
to unravel the intricacies of the traditional historical pattern of what has traditionally been considered as unchangeable one. The process works through historical archives of various societies to explain the formation of discourses and events that have resulted in the fields of knowledge and the formation of discourses of various ages (Foucault, 1982: 133-140). Foucault in the study intends to discover the episteme that underlies certain disciplines and defining traits of knowledge for each period, by the centuries called Foucault. Through this episteme, an object can be understood and understood through certain statements and views, an object can be understood with certain statements and views, not through others.

Yudi Latif speaks the archipelago/Indonesia as a vast ocean territory as well as a fertile land area. These two aspects are inherent in the characteristics of the entire nation of Indonesia. As an “archipelago”, an ocean that is the preferred by Soekarno, the Indonesian archipelago has certain characteristics: the archipelago reflects the nature of the sea. The nature of marine is to absorb and clean, absorb without polluting the environment. As the land area (the point is the islands not the sea), the character of the archipelago is like the land: the ability to receive and grow (Latif, 2011: 2).

Departing from these two types of characteristics, it is certainly very understandable that the Indonesian people can always absorb foreign cultures which come through entire ocean. Foreign nations such as Hindi, Arabs, Chinese people have been traveling around the country for many years with the Indonesian nation by sea. With such a pattern, the Indonesian nation is a cosmopolitan nation and opens to other cultures even before the arrival of the occupiers in this country. In addition, this nation also has the ability to filter and clean elements of culture that are not in accordance with environmental conditions and society. In summary, the archipelago as Denny Lombard states is a region of “cross-cultural” crossing of the world (Lombard, 1987: 59).

The archipelago has the ability to receive and grow. In a region consisting of various islands is any culture and ideology entered. As long as they can be digested and adjusted by the social order and values of the community, they can develop sustainably. In a farming ethos that belongs to rural communities, the values of religiosity flourish and benefit them in the framework of working on their agricultural land. This sense of togetherness and divine values has encouraged and made the archipelago as a place of seeding and pollination of various cultural styles that are more diverse than any other Asian region (Latif, 2011: 3).

The essence of the cultural process is humanization, namely the work of civilization that increasingly creates life to be more humane, more prosperous one another. Humanization from where to where? The humanization of mutual ‘eating’ among fellow were wolves (*homo homini lupus*), and this one that has been practiced in the colonial era or even until this country became independent, towards humanization that treats humanity to others to be able to live side by side (*homo hominisocius*) and civilized.

Why is this a point of departure for observing and understanding Indonesia? This frame is very basic as the interpretation of cultural texts. Furthermore, this condition has phenomenal discourse since the reformation rolling, to seek identity, as a nation.

In the span of half a century after the country became politically independent, the history of state experience proved that the mere reading and mere of Indonesian politics only brought the country into rifts and divisions. Under the power and authority of the Republic of Indonesia, the central and unitary government turned out to make diversity, while localities and ethnicities became subordinate antagonistic, to be obedient, dependent and governed, and then uniformed centrally.

The Indonesians are originally the nation as proclaimed: “We are Indonesian nation, in the 1908 and 1928 cultural texts, which
reads entirely: one land, one language and one nation of Indonesia. This diversity when it is formatted through the politics of the state often falls into the authoritarianism like Soekarno’s guided democracy, or Soeharto’s paternalistic democracy, which has clearly cracked down on Indonesianism and created an abyss of injustice in cultures, religious, ethnic, life in the context of today’s society. In fact, thinking and wishful thinking to become a big and independent country has actually been contextualized by the founders of this country. Bung Karno, Bung Hatta, Sjarir, Agus Salim, Tan Malaka, through a political texts, have proclaimed Indonesia to be an independent nation, respecting every citizen, adopting the rule of law system (not monarchical feudalist state or aristocratic paternalism) and democratic country in which the sovereignty is under the people power (Santoso, ed. 2003: 65).

If the interpretation of Indonesianism has politically failed, what is economically the interpretation of Indonesianism? Economic interpretation of Indonesia that is by increasing economic growth through massive debt actually makes the gap of domestic injustice widened. Economizing by incorporating the globalization of capital, and increasingly becoming a culture of corruption that is difficult to eliminate has now made the people just a coolie, a readable object, an oppressed people.

Goenawan Mohammad symbolizes that Indonesian nations who originally in the idea of sincerity by the nation’s children in parallel is now being processed by power into allegory of broomsticks where the glue is coercion with military authority for unity, while pluralism is uniformed in the treatment of sticks that deny the beauty, the richness of ethnicity, local genius, religion, art and so on. This is the allegory criticized by Bung Hatta in the old Bung Karno in unity rather than organic unity (Santoso, ed. 2003: 351).

There are at least 4 epistemological eras of culture in the course of the Indonesian nation up to now. The first cultural era is a very local era of existence, in this era the basis of the most prominent community system is the “value of solidarity”. The structure of society is a small community that lives in the village. Important decisions are taken by consensus (Alisyahbana, 1977: 14). On an ongoing basis, this era continues in the form of Hindu-Buddhist dominance, although the rationality of the Hindu-Buddhist era is more advanced because it has known the tradition of writing, and introduces a more modern form of kingdom, but this era has similarities on the ontological level. Indonesian society knowledge system is still shrouded myth and custom (Alisyahbana, 1977: 14).

In the standard of modern rationality, the era, according to Alisyahbana, Indonesian society knowledge system is still covered with myth and custom (Alisyahbana, 1977: 14). However, in the perspective of structuralism, myth is very important and affects the social and cultural system of Indonesian society, even today, myth is still running. However, the ‘myth’ must be interpreted according to the present context to advance civilization rather than myth as a barrier to the civilization of rationality. Because after all the ‘myth’ is also the result of rationalization done by the ancestors of this nation.

The Assessment of Providence over the ‘irrationality’ of pre-colonial Indonesian society is of course based on the flow of modernity and individual freedom as freely as possible. According to Adinegoro’s assessment, this Takdir’s campaign will plunge Indonesian society and people into capitalism and imperialism. According to him, the progress that Takdir is referring to is “civilisatie” rather than culture, ‘its skin’ is not ‘wood’. There is a nation that has only civilisatie alone, is not culturally, like a human being ‘face beautiful rotten heart’, there is also a nation whose culture is high but its civilisatie on average, like the Chinese nation. Some examples of nation which have attained both are the nation of Japan, Eastern culture with Western civilisatie. Thus, leaders must be able to distinguish cultures and civilisatie (Baso, 2012: 36).
Culture is the character and soul that pass on to the human, while the old clothes are beautify the culture. Culture is permanent, often culture is called personality. According to Adinegoro, *civilisatie* is not permanent, therefore it can move around. The Japanese have been able to equate *themselves* with the Europeans because its *civilisatie* has been over-*its* from the West, but its culture remains as *a la* Chinese. The debate among the nationalist thinkers came about because the founders of this nation brought up the culture, while Takdir proposed *civilisatie* (Baso, 2012: 36).

Regardless of the debate, the author sees that the Indonesian people's worldview cannot be separated from the 'strong' divine dominance - of course God in the concept of the past - in all spheres of life. When viewed in a triadic relationship (God-Human-Human), the strong dominance of the worldview lays 'God' as the center, thus eliminating the axis of nature and even the man himself. In understanding the world, it is placed as an 'intermediary' to get to God. The noble values that are believed to originate from divinity also have an effect on the political practice of society. That is, politics is not understood as an arts activity in achieving power to bring about prosperity, but political-power-*is* understood as a gift from the divine. Now, the negative side of this perspective can be felt until now when the relationship of religion and the state has never been completed, this is a sign that the formation of reasoning is still very pronounced.

The next era is the early cultural era of Islam. In this era Indonesian local genius can complement each other, there is a process of merging, combining the original elements with elements of Islam that appears to be a new cultural pattern. So that a syncretic result was constructed with the sentence: Islamic Indonesia; Indonesian Islam. Definitively, local genius is the presence of traditional elements or traits that can survive and even have the ability to accommodate elements that come from outside and integrate them into indigenous cultures (Ayatrohaedi, ed. 1986: 31).

The next era was the cultural era of Islamic establishment in Indonesia. During the Islamic Empire, Islam as a new religion had begun to be embraced by many kingdoms in the archipelago. Of course this new religion has contributed greatly to the formation of a new worldview for the people of the archipelago. With an egalitarian character, namely rejecting caste stratification in the past, Islam has given the power to encourage the formation of a new religious society with an emphasis on similarity values which are inherent rights to human beings. The concept of the unity of the *ummah* has also led to a new concept called unity. With their religious identity in common, the kingdoms of the archipelago — such as the Kingdom of Samudera Pasai in Sumatra, the Islamic Sultanate of Aceh, Demak Employment, Pajang Kingdom, Mataram Sultanate, Banten Kingdom, Ternate, Tidore, Baca, Jailolo Kingdom, and Makasar Gowa Kingdom, as well as others were increasingly intensive to establish their cooperation in expelling Dutch colonizers who had seized the rights of social, territorial, economic, and political power in their respective regions.

In this era, it seems that it is also taught to associate and unite with fellow children of the entire archipelago, regardless of ethnicity, religious background, and so on. They are taught to interact harmoniously among various national communities (Baso, 2012: 51). Islam as embraced by various kingdoms has become the seed of the unity of Indonesian unity in the archipelago and has also been the driving force of persistent resistance from the Indonesian people against Portuguese, Spanish, British and Dutch colonists. Knowledge in this era is enshrined for the interests and safety of the nation and the nation.

Therefore, education in this era is directed at teaching various types of Nusantara culture which will become a unifying tool, defense and mobilization of all national forces. Education is also directed to be able to get along more widely with other nations in the path of world trade in the Indian Ocean, as well as tactics to tackle European (now American) people who intend to control the region in Southeast Asia. Islamic
education is also directed at maximizing and utilizing all the economic and resource potential of the country. That is why education must be close to energy sources (Baso, 2012: 51).

Science in that era consisted of 14 types:
1. Science of ushul (Tauhīd) and Ilmu Kalam
2. Science of Fiqh and Usul Fiqh (Including Law, Law and Jurisprudence)
3. Interpretation and the Science of Hadith
4. Science of Sufism and Ethical Sciences (Akhlāq)
5. Language and Grammar Science (Naḥw Science, ṣaraf Science, Archipelago Language Knowledge, and lexicography)
6. Balāgah Science and Mantiq Science
While for the general science categories that enter this community or civilization are:
7. Agricultural Sciences (Earth Sciences)
8. Science Tib (Medicine) and Medicine
9. Astronomy, Falak Science
10. Mathematics and Algebra
11. Engineering Sciences
12. Earth Sciences, Natural Sciences and Biological Sciences
13. Science of Syajarah (History)
14. Social Sciences (Political Science, State Science, and Economic Sciences)

The following is a glimpse of an example of an explanation of some of the knowledge and processing. 1). *Ilmu Kalām*. the basic sciences of religion, usūl al-Dīn, tauhīd and the science of kalām were carried out through the books of ‘Aqā‘īd an-Nafāsī by Najmuddin Umar bin Muhammad an-Nafāsī, Ummul-Barāhin by Abu Abdillah Muhammad bib Yusuf as-Sanusi, and as-Samarqandi by Abu-l-Layst. Almost all of these works were translated or commented in Javanese and Malay by Nusantara ulama. Processing jurisprudence in seeing the introduction and deepening of jurisprudence, there is actualization of jurisprudence into the justice system, then there is the theorization of jurisprudence into ushul fiqh, for example an-Nafahat ‘alā Syarḥīl Waraqat by Sheikh Achmad Khathib Minangkbau which is a Waraqat text commentary. 3). The Science of Interpretation and Hadith, some of the works of archipelago scholars at that time in the field of interpretation in the form of short texts that reviewed the problems of nubuwah and treatises plucked from the book of Mafāṭih al-Gaib by ar Razi, or in the hadith of Isryadus Sari, Shahih Bukhari Muslim. It’s just that the interpretation reading model in this era has two trends. There are those who read the work of the interpreter further, there are also those who read the interpretation based on the companions of the Prophet, as well as the sufism approach to certain verses in the Qu’ran (Baso, 2012: 278-285). Next is Sufism and Ethics (Akhlāq), the largest portion is occupied by al-Ghazali texts and religious texts.

The fourth cultural era is the era of Dutch colonialism, an era of oppressive, structurally hegemonic. In this era also the patterns of cultivation into a nation that is soft, lazy, and not civilized is shaped in such a way massively and collectively. These patterns are still left and clearly become obstacles in advancing this nation. In fact, colonialism is not just merely a political and economic oppression but a massive pattern of reasoning or mental colonialism, the assassination of character and national identity, the intellectual cleansing by the Dutch colonialists on this nation. And until now, after this country has liberated itself politically, the patterns of rational or mental colonialism are still left, a deep impression. The colonial period also introduced individual productivity which in its development the world’s economic politics focused on the human being as a consumptive unit that actually excluded the actions of solidarity and democratization (Santoso, ed. 2003: 352).
CONCLUSION

The basic idea of a post-structuralism approach lies in that structure is no longer binary opposition, or face to face, but rather post-structuralism reviews the “text” as a source of paradoxical subjectivity and culture and questions the review. Moreover, post-structuralism also questions the “other” or the other radically in the subject-object relationship. The other core of post-structuralism thinking is that thinking is always moving, not just fixed by the order that has been considered established.

The post-structuralism and historical approach led Al-Jabiri to dismantle the knowledge system underlying the building of Arab-Islamic knowledge, namely in the form of three episteme. These three episteme also direct and underlie the thinking patterns of the Arab-Islamic community. In reality, burhani or rational reasoning (masyriq) is not able to compensate for the strong textual reasoning, but what happens is just the reason for burhani “grace” to him. It was this disappointment that made Al-Jabiri step up to use the epistemological term ‘termination’ and the other concept to come out of the three episteme and offer the burhani logical reasoning (magrib) in solving the needs so far.

Al-Jabiri’s reasoning critics see there is a reason outside the textand reason that is meant by al-Jabiri is a device, not as a product to spawn theoretical products formed by a culture that has its own peculiarities, its own episteme, culture that contains the history of Arab civilization, reflecting the reality and future ambitions and reflecting and expressing obstacles that hamper progress and the causes of their current setbacks. Modification of the episteme concept by al-Jabiri in the form of: “subconscious structure”, in other words, episteme is a system of knowledge in a particular culture in the form of an unconscious structure. Al-Jabiri, through archaeological searches, found an underlying knowledge system in each particular historical era. It is the knowledge system (episteme) that actually directs, interprets, and guides the outlook of the Arab-Islamic community up to now. Although al-Jabiri found three systems of knowledge, in practice al-Jabiri revealed that there was only one knowledge system that dominated and influenced the practice of reasoning and decision-making in the field of religion to other areas of culture, such as science and politics. In episteme, sometimes there are cracks, discontinuities or ‘discontinuity’, epistemic analysis in a period tells what there is a discontinuation. Disconnection is not merely covered but expressed as it is. The model of the termination of the epistemology is used by Al-Jabiri to refine Arabic reason explicitly, from the structure of Arabic reasoning since the “century of decline”, as well as various forms of its extension from the modern to contemporary centuries. Termination of epistemology occurs at the level of mental action, namely subconscious activity, which is defined in certain cognitive fields; namely conceptual thinking. The epistemological termination of al-Jabiri is precisely in the epistemology of the masriri (east), because according to him this epistemology is no longer able to be relied upon as a result of ’communion’ which is difficult to deconstruct because of its level of establishment, both at the epistemic level and at the socio-cultural level. In short, the epistemological termination was carried out by al-Jabiri by conducting an episteme rearrangement that grew in the magrib tradition.

This epistemological reflection found its relevance when the writer divided three (3) cultural eras of Indonesian (Islamic) reasoning. At least in the first cultural era we found reason that was transcendent, collective and of course harmonious. In this era it can be called al-mawruūṣ al-qādim (pre-Islamic inheritance in the context of Indonesia). This collective legacy of the past left a trace of civilization that can be said to be high, especially in the fields of trade, maritime and engineering and even medicine. The characteristic of this era is its dominance of reason ‘irfānī who gained its base in Nusantara wisdom. Next, when the arrival of the Islamic Archipelago can be said to be bayānī and ‘irfānī reasoning which is ‘united’ as happened in Arabia,
this also happens in Indonesia, while the burhani reasoning is almost eliminated. However, there are quite visible differences when Bayânî-Irfani’s reasoning is in the culture of Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, religious and cultural integration took place which gave birth to a new cultural strategy model, both at the level of knowledge and at the political level. While in the Colonial era, the relationship between Islam and the State (Colonial) took place in the struggle for identity and control.

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